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Abstract 
Two of the most important milestones in children’s development are joint action (acting with 
others) and joint attention (attending with others).  These are popular fields in both psychology 
and philosophy, but have formed surprisingly independent literatures despite the close 
similarities they share in terms of theoretical and methodological issues.  This article 
systematically compares these fields and draws attention to specific and more general ways in 
which each could benefit from the other if communication between them were increased.  We 
highlight a clear opportunity within these fields, but this could be a useful approach in cognitive 
science more generally. 
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Social interaction is a crucial and pervasive component of human behaviour, and is 
consequently a skill at which we are highly adept.  As a result, cognitive development research 
has focussed heavily on the developmental milestones that allow us to perform both simple and 
more complex joint behaviours.  Two of the most important of these milestones are joint action 
and joint attention.  These abilities have attracted a huge amount of interest from both 
philosophers and psychologists, studying both children and adults, but have each become the 
centre of largely independent literatures.  Despite the relative lack of communication between 
these literatures, they have evolved in very similar ways and stumbled across similar issues.  We 
argue that they would benefit from direct comparison, particularly where each area has identified 
different solutions that could be shared.  Here we thus aim to initiate the building of a bridge 
between the fields of joint action and joint attention from both a psychological and a 
philosophical perspective.  We start by highlighting the similar problems these fields have come 
across when attempting to define these concepts, particularly when defining what level of 
interaction constitutes “jointness.”  We go on to discuss how researchers in each field have 
attempted to identify jointness using experimental studies, pointing out where cross-over could 
be beneficial.  This is followed by a discussion of how we achieve jointness when acting and/or 
attending together.  We then highlight some additional issues that can be compared across fields, 
and provide ways in which comparison can aid progress in both methodology and theory.   
Difficulties with definition 
Joint action refers to the co-ordination of actions between two or more individuals.  There 
are different definitions of joint action that stipulate lower vs. higher levels of processing of the 
other’s mental states.  For example, Sebanz, Bekkering and Knoblich (2006) use an inclusive 
definition, proposing that joint action is “any form of social interaction whereby two or more 
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individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the 
environment” (p. 70).  This could include coordinated acts such as birds flocking, which do not 
necessarily involve understanding of the intentions of the other individuals in the group, but 
instead can be achieved by reactions to perceptual information from the other group members 
(e.g. direction of flight).  At the other end of the scale, Bratman (1992) defines a specific type of 
joint action, Shared Cooperative Activity, as requiring both actors to understand the intentions of 
the other to achieve a shared goal, to be committed to the joint activity, to have common 
knowledge that this is the case and to be committed to supporting the partner.  This is clearly a 
much more cognitively demanding definition involving bidirectional understanding of mental 
states and obligations.   
Similarly, definitions of joint attention also range from very inclusive to very restrictive.  
For example, Butterworth (1995) simply defined joint attention as “looking where others are 
looking” (p. 29).  This would include behaviours of non-human animals where both parties are 
attending to the same thing, but there is not necessarily any common knowledge between the two 
that they are doing so.  In contrast, Tomasello (1995) specifies a more restrictive definition in 
which it is necessary that the individuals not only attend to the same object, but also both know 
together that they are attending to the object and each other’s attention.  This maps directly onto 
the common knowledge requirement in Bratman’s (1992) definition of joint action.  
It should be noted that for both joint action and joint attention it is not the case that one 
definition is correct and others are incorrect, in the sense that there is in fact a range of different 
levels of ‘joint’ behaviour.  For example, within joint attention there are many other definitions 
that lie between the most inclusive and most restrictive (e.g. see Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; 
Leavens & Racine, 2009).  One possibility suggested by Emery (2000) is to split these types of 
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behaviours into two categories:  “joint attention”, which includes behaviours without shared 
knowledge, versus “shared attention”, which includes behaviours with shared knowledge.  It 
would already be extremely helpful if researchers would use the terms “joint” and “shared” in 
this way universally in both fields.  However, this distinction still may not be thorough enough to 
eradicate confusion entirely where further ranges of behaviours exist within each category (see 
Siposova & Carpenter, forthcoming, for a more detailed typology of different levels of joint 
attention and joint action).  In short, it would be helpful if there was agreement both within and 
across fields about terminology so that the same terms are not used to describe different ranges 
of behaviour.  This variation in definitions causes confusion in the literature (e.g. see Leavens & 
Racine, 2009, versus Carpenter & Call, 2013:  each argue for or against joint attention in great 
apes, respectively, but use different definitions of joint attention).  This variation in definitions 
also leads to some of the issues outlined below, such as how to fulfil a criterion of true jointness.  
Interestingly, the qualities about which scholars disagree are highly comparable across both 
literatures, for example with regard to the criterion of common knowledge.  Thus, an important 
first step for both fields is to establish agreement on how to define the different levels of each 
phenomenon.  Once this has been achieved, it will be easier to identify further parallels between 
the two literatures that can aid progress in both. 
How can we identify jointness? 
 As individuals, it may seem trivially clear to us when we are involved in joint action 
and/or joint attention with another person (Reddy, 2003).  However, this may not always be so 
easy to distinguish as an empirical observer.  Here we outline two ways that researchers have 
come up with to overcome this problem:  exploiting unwanted side-effects of jointness, such as 
self-other interference, and experimentally manipulating factors that might increase jointness and 
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measuring the corresponding changes in behaviour.  Both of these approaches enable us to test 
the criteria laid out by the different definitions outlined above, to see whether fulfilling a given 
criterion produces changes in behaviour.  If so, then the criterion can be assumed to be 
meaningful to jointness in some way. 
Self-Other Interference.  One particularly interesting phenomenon that is frequently cited 
as evidence of jointness is self-other integration and interference.  This is the phenomenon that 
when individuals are participating in joint action, they often experience a merging of 
representations of self and other.  This has been identified in several different fields, including 
joint task representations (Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 2003), joint focus of attention (Böckler, 
Knoblich & Sebanz, 2012), perspective-taking (Surtees & Apperly, 2012), motor representations 
(Brass, Ruby & Spengler, 2009) and emotion understanding (Steinbeis, 2016).  Influence 
between self and other can occur bidirectionally, so that an individual may either egocentrically 
project representations of the self onto another person, or alternatively find their own self 
representations influenced by representations of the other.  This mechanism has been argued to 
aid us in predicting a coordination partner’s actions and adapting our own accordingly (Vesper et 
al., 2010).  Interestingly, it can actually result in reduced performance in some tasks.  For 
example, individuals are less able to judge their own visual perspective on a scene if another 
individual is present who holds a different perspective (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite & 
Andrews, 2010).  This kind of interference from another person has been exploited in empirical 
research to demonstrate the presence of self-other influence, as well as to demonstrate its 
automaticity. 
The phenomenon of self-other interference is evidence for a degree of jointness, and as 
such it is useful to study across development to see when children can be considered to be acting 
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jointly.  Egocentrism in children is a well-established phenomenon, whereby individuals assume 
that their own thoughts and emotions are shared by others.  This has been established in the 
fields of visual perspective-taking (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956) and mental state attribution 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983), with children younger than around 3-4 years tending to respond as 
though others have the same perspective or mental state as they do even when this is not the 
case.  
However, egocentrism (influence from self to other) is less indicative of jointness than 
influence in the opposite direction, because egocentrism does not necessarily require 
representation of the other person at all.  In contrast, interference from other to self is direct 
evidence that the other is represented, and that this representation influences the pre-existing 
representation of one’s own perspective or mental state.  This has been researched to a lesser 
degree than egocentrism, but there is some evidence that children do experience such other-self 
interference.  In the field of joint action, several studies have shown that when 4- to 5-year-old 
children perform a task alongside a partner, even when it is not necessary to represent their 
partner’s different task, they make mistakes or hesitations consistent with doing so (Milward, 
Kita & Apperly, 2014; Milward, Kita & Apperly, 2016; Saby, Bouquet & Marshall, 2014).  In 
joint attention research, adults have been shown to experience similar interference from another 
person’s focus of attention (Böckler et al., 2012).  No work has yet been done on this with 
children in a joint attention context per se, but similar results have been found in a perspective-
taking context.  Six-year-olds respond more slowly when judging their own perspective on an 
object presented on a computer screen if an avatar on the screen had a different perspective 
(Surtees, Butterfill & Apperly, 2012).  It would be interesting to adapt the Böckler et al. (2012) 
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task to investigate whether similar automatic self-other interference can be found with children 
in a joint attention context.     
Although self-other interference is discussed as evidence for jointness, it also occurs even 
in circumstances in which the individuals involved are acting or attending merely in parallel to 
one another, not truly jointly.  For example, in the joint action studies described above, the two 
participants in the task are each required to follow their own task rule.  Although they are aware 
of their partner’s task rule, it is completely irrelevant to and independent of their own rule.  
Likewise, in the joint attention and perspective-taking studies above (Böckler et al., 2012; 
Surtees et al., 2012), the attention or perspective of the partner is completely irrelevant to the 
participant, and yet participants still represent it.  This is interesting and informative, as it 
suggests that this is an automatic process, which may have evolved as a result of humans’ highly 
collaborative nature (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005), but which is over-active 
even in circumstances in which it does not provide the benefit of aiding prediction of a 
collaborative partner.  It can thus be triggered merely by the observation of or belief that another 
person is performing a certain task role, regardless of whether that role is being performed as 
part of a collaborative effort.  This thus limits the extent to which this phenomenon can inform us 
about different levels of joint action and attention.  It would be informative to investigate 
whether even stronger co-representation effects are seen in higher level scenarios involving 
common knowledge. 
Manipulating the joint context.  Another approach to identifying jointness is to 
experimentally manipulate factors hypothesised to elicit jointness and identify some of the 
observable consequences of these manipulations.  For example, researchers often compare the 
effects of scenarios in which individuals act or attend in synchrony or congruence with one 
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another (fulfilling lower level definitions of jointness) to those in which they act in asynchrony 
or incongruence.  At a higher level, researchers also often compare situations in which 
individuals share goals or attention with one another (fulfilling higher level definitions) to 
scenarios in which they either act in parallel or observe others acting individually.   
In joint action, researchers have manipulated low level synchrony in order to observe 
how this affects participants’ attitudes and behaviour to another person.  For example, Hove and  
Risen (2009) found that manipulating individuals’ finger-tapping synchrony with an 
experimenter led to modulation of their ratings of affiliation, with higher affiliation to 
synchronous experimenters (see also, e.g. Cirelli, Einarson & Trainor, 2014; Tuncgenc, Cohen, 
& Fawcett, 2015, for similar results with infants).  At a higher level, studies have shown 
differences in behaviour depending on whether participants were collaborating on a joint goal or 
not.  For example, Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg and Tomasello (2011) found that 3-year-old 
children, but not chimpanzees, shared resources with their partner more equally when the 
resources were acquired as a result of collaboration rather than a windfall or parallel work.  
Additionally, sharing a joint goal can induce a feeling of commitment or obligation, which may 
result in persisting at an activity for longer than if no obligation is present.  Hamann, Warneken 
and Tomasello (2012) found that 3.5-year-olds were more likely to continue an activity even 
after they had already received their reward but their partner had not yet, when the activity was 
collaborative than when it was non-collaborative.  Further, Gräfenhain, Carpenter and Tomasello 
(2013) found that 3-year-olds were more likely to wait for and help their partner if they had 
made a verbal joint commitment than if they had not.  Finally, Plötner, Over, Carpenter and 
Tomasello (2015) showed that 5-year-old children were more likely to trust, help and like their 
collaborative partners over individuals they had not collaborated with, even after the 
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collaborative activity was over, suggesting that jointness alters the attitudes that individuals have 
towards others. These studies show how sharing a collaborative experience can alter the 
behaviours and attitudes of individuals, as compared to individual experiences involving 
identical actions.  
Similarly, studies on joint attention have shown effects of gaze following (i.e. lower level 
joint attention) on attitudes towards gaze partners and processing of observed objects.  Research 
with adults found that participants prefer avatars who followed their gaze to an object over those 
who looked away (Bayliss & Tipper, 1996) and they also prefer objects that were gazed at 
mutually over those that were not (Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, & Tipper, 2006).  Additionally, infants 
show a novelty preference for objects that they have not previously seen an adult gazing toward 
(Reid & Striano, 2005; see also Reid, Striano, Kaufman & Johnson, 2004 for differences in ERP 
responses).  At a higher level of joint attention involving shared experiences or common ground, 
differences have been shown in infants’ communication depending on whether they had just 
shared attention to an object or event with their partner or not.  These studies have found that 1-
year-old infants both initiate gestural communication (Liebal, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2010) and 
respond to others’ gestural and verbal communication (Ganea & Saylor, 2007; Liebal, Behne, 
Carpenter & Tomasello, 2009; Saylor & Ganea, 2007) differently depending on what objects or 
events they had previously attended to jointly with their partner (vs. another partner).  For 
example, the infants in the Liebal et al. (2010) study pointed to objects that were most relevant to 
the experience they had just shared with their communicative partner.  With a series of control 
conditions, Moll, Richter, Carpenter and Tomasello (2008) demonstrated that children’s 
responses were based on particular experiences they had previously shared with the particular 
partner with whom they were interacting, rather than on their own individual experiences, or 
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their partner’s own individual experiences.  Furthermore, Moll, Carpenter and Tomasello (2007) 
found that 14-month-old infants could only correctly identify which objects an experimenter had 
previously seen when they had previously shared attention to those objects with her – they could 
not do this when they had previously merely observed the experimenter attending to the objects 
herself.  Although the same information regarding what the experimenter had seen was available 
in both scenarios, the addition of sharing looks between the child and the experimenter provided 
important extra information for infants at this age.  This is a clear demonstration of the 
distinctive value of jointness for processing of information from social interactions.   
The fields of joint action and joint attention have thus developed a range of methods for 
measuring jointness.  Within joint action, researchers have investigated interference from 
automatic co-representation and changes in prosocial behaviour, attitudes towards and 
commitment to a partner following joint action, whereas within joint attention researchers have 
focussed on differences in preferences, processing and communication following joint versus 
individual experiences.  It might be valuable to introduce these respective methods to the other 
field, for example by investigating whether there are differing degrees of self-other interference 
in high versus lower level joint action and joint attention, or differences in communication in 
joint vs. parallel action contexts (see below for a step in this direction).  Again, researchers 
should keep in mind which level of jointness their studies are demonstrating and adopt 
appropriate terminology accordingly. 
How do we achieve jointness? 
 Having established that whether interactions are joint or not seems to result in important 
differences in behaviour and attitudes, the question remains how we coordinate or share action 
and attention with others in the first place.  One answer to this question for joint action is low 
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level action coordination.  For example, individuals in close proximity often end up 
synchronising their rhythmic movements, such as walking in step with one another (Van Ulzen, 
Lamoth, Daffertshofer, Semin & Beek, 2008).  This is just one of several lower level 
mechanisms (see also the section on top-down versus bottom-up processing below) that seem to 
create a level of jointness at an implicit level.  However, this cannot explain higher levels of 
jointness, where not only do I coordinate with you at an implicit level, but we both intend to 
collaborate towards a goal that we know is shared between us.  Similarly, low level mechanisms 
can go some way toward explaining joint attention.  For example, not only do we often 
automatically follow others’ gaze, we also are sensitive to our own gaze being followed 
(Edwards, Stephenson, Dalmaso & Bayliss, 2015).  We thus have very effective mechanisms for 
knowing when we are looking at the same thing as someone else.  However, this does not 
explain how we achieve higher levels of jointness, where not only do I know that you have seen 
what I have seen and vice versa, but we also know this together.   
One way in which we might go a step further in achieving a higher level of jointness is 
via communication.  This was first suggested in the developmental joint attention literature.  The 
idea is that true sharing of attention – knowing together that we are sharing attention – is 
achieved via communication (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011).  This can be verbal or gestural 
communication once children have mastered these, for example when an infant points to an 
object for her mother and the mother responds with a positive comment about it.  However, one 
even simpler way of communicating knowing together is simply through a “sharing look,” when 
two individuals alternate between looking at the object of attention and engaging in 
communicative eye contact with each other (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011).  Infants begin engaging 
in these communicative, “sharing looks” from around 9 months of age (e.g., Venezia, Messinger, 
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Thorp & Mundy, 2004), suggesting that they may be capable of a high level of jointness from 
very early in ontogeny. 
The importance of sharing looks has also been investigated in the developmental joint 
action literature, somewhat later in development.  Wyman, Rakoczy and Tomasello (2012) found 
that these types of looks can facilitate joint action by helping partners solve coordination 
problems.  They had 4-year-old children play a coordination game in which children needed to 
decide whether to risk playing cooperatively with their partner for a large reward, or play 
individually for a smaller reward.  They found that children were more likely to choose to 
coordinate for the larger reward when their partner made eye contact and smiled than when she 
did not, suggesting that they interpreted this sharing look as a signal for joint action.  Following 
up on this finding, Siposova, Tomasello and Carpenter (submitted) showed that (silent) 
communicative, but not non-communicative, eye contact can even be taken by 6- to 7-year-old 
children as a commitment on their partner’s part to cooperate, as evidenced by children’s 
normative protests (e.g. “You should do what you said you would do!”) when their partner 
subsequently chose to play individually.  
While developmental researchers have investigated the role of communication in 
establishing joint action, researchers studying adults have focussed on its role in maintaining 
joint action once it is established.   They have documented a form of sensorimotor 
communication in joint action, in which individuals modulate the actions that they perform as 
part of the task in order to make them more predictable to their co-actors (Vesper et al., 2017).  
For example, Goebl and Palmer (2009) found that pianists playing a duet raised their fingers 
higher when auditory feedback between the two actors was reduced, suggesting that they 
modulated their actions in order to aid predictability and coordination.  This has yet to be studied 
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in children and might provide another useful indicator of jointness, as sharing looks have done 
for both joint action and joint attention.   
Communication, both verbal and non-verbal, has been highlighted as a way in which a 
higher level of jointness may arise.  This has been discussed independently in both the fields of 
joint action and joint attention, but both fields could benefit from sharing ideas.  For example, 
one step could be to investigate the role of communication not just in creating jointness in joint 
attention, but also in maintaining jointness, as has been studied in the adult joint action literature.   
Issues beyond jointness 
Content of representations.  Beyond the issue of how much is shared between 
participants in an interaction, a further issue that arises from questions surrounding social 
representations is what the actual content of these representations is, regardless of the degree to 
which they are shared.  This is a question that has been raised independently in the joint action 
and joint attention literatures, yet each has information that they can contribute to the other. 
In joint action research, this question has arisen in the debate around task co-
representation.  Studies showing interference from a partner’s task do not necessarily 
demonstrate which aspect of the task is being represented.  One possibility is that it is the 
partner’s action that is represented, which is supported by research showing interference when 
performing an action and observing another’s incompatible action (e.g. Kilner, Paulignan & 
Blakemore, 2003).  This should mean that an identical action performed on a different object (for 
example me tapping a green button and you tapping a blue button) would not cause interference.  
However, in most studies showing co-representation interference, the action is, in fact, the same 
for both individuals, but is directed towards different objects (e.g. different response buttons), 
suggesting that it cannot be merely representation of the action that causes interference.  This led 
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researchers to argue that what is being represented is the task rule, that is, to make a certain 
response to a certain stimulus (Sebanz et al., 2003).  However, a study by Wenke, Atmaca, 
Holländer, Liepelt, Baess and Prinz (2011) found evidence that partners in a joint task do not 
represent the exact stimulus-response mappings of their partner (i.e. what their task was), but 
rather whether it was their partner’s turn or not (i.e. when they had to respond).  This suggests 
yet another alternative, which is that individuals represent how the task is divided between self 
and other (“I respond when I see A or B, you respond when you see C or D”), but not what the 
specifics of the task rules are for their partner (“When you see C you respond with action 1, 
when you see D you respond with action 2).  The discussion in this field tends to assume that 
only one of these possible representation contents is correct, so that co-representation always 
involves representing a certain type of information (e.g. stimulus-response mapping).  However, 
we suggest that an alternative may be that the type of representation depends on the context.  
This discussion was originally raised in the adult literature, but it applies equally to findings on 
task co-representation in children.  Indeed, the possibility of multiple types of representation 
content, requiring different levels of cognitive maturity, may be even more relevant for the 
developmental literature. 
In fact, a similar question has arisen in the developmental joint attention research, 
regarding whether children represent simply what object has been shared in attention with 
another person, or also how it has been shared.  Moll et al. (2008) showed that 14-month-old 
infants can correctly identify which of several objects an adult is attending to ambiguously based 
on exactly how they had shared attention to each of the objects just previously (i.e., based on 
where and how repeatedly they had found the objects, and the emotions, such as surprise, 
expressed with each one).  Although this also raises the question of what the content of the 
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representation is, it differs from the joint action co-representation literature in that it does not 
assume that only one is correct.  Instead, it assumes that different types of information can be 
represented depending on the context, or even the age of the individual.  This idea has been taken 
from the huge body of work on perspective-taking, which demonstrates a dissociation between 
understanding what an observer sees (Level-1 perspective), versus how they see it (Level 2 
perspective; Flavell, 1978).  Much converging data now suggests that these levels of 
understanding show different developmental trajectories (Surtees & Apperly, 2012) and are 
subject to different signature limits (Surtees et al., 2012), supporting the theory that they involve 
distinct systems (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).    
The progress that has been made in perspective-taking and its influence on joint attention 
research could also be useful in the field of joint action.  It may be profitable to consider the 
possibility that there is not just one type of information that is represented during a joint task, but 
rather that the type of representation differs depending on the context.  Further, it may even be 
that there are different systems dedicated to different types of information.  For example, it is 
possible that certain tasks may elicit co-representation of a partner’s precise stimulus-response 
mappings, but others only elicit co-representation of information regarding which agent is 
responsible for which task set.  If this is the case, comparing co-representation across different 
tasks and across development, as has been done in the perspective-taking literature, would be 
enlightening. 
Top-down versus bottom-up processing.  The actions of an individual can either be 
intentionally directed towards an object (top-down processing; Gregory, 1970) or reflexively 
drawn to an object as a result of an attention-getter (bottom-up processing, Gibson, 1966).  This 
is not just the case for individuals, but also for interpersonal interactions involving objects.   
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For joint action, Knoblich, Butterfill and Sebanz (2011) argue that coordination may 
result from explicit and intentional efforts on the part of the actors, with a joint aim of achieving 
a joint goal (planned coordination).  Alternatively, coordination may emerge spontaneously as a 
reflexive response to the actions of another person (emergent coordination).  Emergent 
coordination could thus be seen as corresponding with bottom-up joint attention, in that it is 
elicited externally, whereas planned coordination is similar to top-down joint attention, which is 
initiated internally by an individual or group.   
The processes associated with these two types of emergent versus planned coordination 
are likely to be different.  For planned coordination, Knoblich et al. (2011) specify (at least) two 
processes: shared task representations and joint perceptions.  These involve representing the task 
requirements of a partner, and representing their perceptions (e.g. their visual perspective), 
respectively.  In contrast, for emergent coordination, they specify four possible processes: 
entrainment, common affordances, perception-action matching and action simulation.  
Entrainment is a social motor process, also described above, that results in individuals 
unconsciously synchronising with one another when making rhythmic movements such as 
walking together (Van Ulzen et al., 2008).  Common affordances (Gibson, 1977) refers to the 
properties of an object that result in similar actions from two individuals, such as both producing 
similar grasping motions due to the shape and size of the objects to be grasped.  Perception-
action matching (Hommel, Muesseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001) is another process that can 
lead to mimicry of another person, due to perception of another’s actions resulting in activation 
of similar motor representations and a subsequent tendency to produce the same action.  Lastly, 
action simulation is a process by which individuals form predictions about another’s actions 
based on internal simulation of the action themselves (Gallese & Goldman, 1998).  Knoblich et 
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al. (2011) argue that emergent coordination plays an important role in facilitating joint action, so 
discriminating between different processes that may be triggered by different contexts provides a 
more detailed picture of joint action as a whole as opposed to merely focussing on the initiation 
of top-down, planned actions.  Furthermore, they also underline the potential for interaction 
between emergent and planned coordination for efficient joint action.   
A similar distinction has been drawn for joint attention. Top-down processing may occur 
as a result of one individual attracting the attention of another to an object (e.g. via gaze leading: 
Bayliss, Murphy, Naughtin, Kirtikos, Schilbach & Becker, 2013; or communication: Carpenter 
& Liebal, 2011).  Bottom-up processing may occur when an attention-getting event, such as an 
object falling, attracts the attention of both individuals and subsequently leads to sharing of 
attention to the event.  Depending on which of these two scenarios individuals find themselves 
in, different steps of communication may be required in order to achieve joint attention 
(Carpenter & Liebal, 2011).  In salient bottom-up scenarios, a single “sharing look” is likely 
sufficient to create joint attention, whereas in top-down scenarios one actor may need to perform 
several communicative steps in order to initiate attention with the other, direct her towards the 
object of interest and then, finally, to acknowledge the experience with a “sharing look.” 
Both the potential for multiple types of bottom-up and top-down processes and the 
possibility of interaction between these two forms of processing (as suggested by Knoblich et al., 
2011, for joint action) could also be relevant for joint attention research.  For example, it may be 
useful to investigate how joint attention is maintained or how it changes over the course of an 
interaction.  For instance, an interaction could be initiated by bottom-up attention, but once this 
is established, top-down processes may play a role in maintaining the interaction.  For example, 
in a bottom-up context, Edwards et al. (2015) found that adults whose gaze towards an object 
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had been followed by another person subsequently looked towards the other’s eyes, thereby 
identifying that their gaze had been followed.  Alternatively, attention could be initiated by top-
down attention, but then use emergent processes to help to maintain the interaction.  This may 
have the benefit, as it seems to in joint action, that less cognitive effort is required in order to 
uphold jointness and coordination across time. 
Conclusions 
We have highlighted how similar the two independent fields of joint action and joint 
attention are, despite their complexity – a complexity which is compounded by the fact that the 
divisions between them exist in both psychology and philosophy separately.  All four areas have 
struggled with similar issues regarding how to define jointness, how to identify it using empirical 
work and how it is achieved by individuals involved in an interaction.  Beyond the tricky issue of 
jointness, there are also other issues that bear significant resemblance across fields, including 
how to approach possible differences in the content of co-representations and the possibility of 
multiple systems, as well as distinguishing between top-down versus bottom-up processing in a 
joint context.  In addressing each of these issues, we have highlighted ways in which bridging the 
gap between fields could be beneficial.  One way of doing so is to adapt theoretical approaches 
that have been used in one field to see how they could apply to another, such as considering 
whether multiple types of representational content or different systems could be involved in joint 
action co-representation.  Another way would be to share methods, such as implementing self-
other interference paradigms in joint attention settings or identifying signature limits of joint 
action co-representation.  Systematic comparisons such as we have presented here can help to 
promote the sharing of ideas across fields and also to identify ways in which different aspects of 
social coordination can interact with one another.  This type of cross-talk between fields should 
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be encouraged more generally in cognitive science, and particularly between fields that clearly 
have so many parallels to be drawn.  
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